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LAW OF CONTRACTS
and that apparent inconsistencies in the cases can usually be
accounted for by a distinction in the facts. On the other hand,
the chief characteristics of a jomt adventure cannot be lost sight
of, but must be applied to the particular facts for the purpose of
determining the existence of the relationship. Having found the
relationship to exist, the chief difficulty has been surmounted, for
the legal incidents of such relationship are now well settled.
F aDERiciK G. HA3EY.*
*Of the Seattle Bar.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS**
Topic C. Consideration and Its Sufficiency
Section 75. DEFNTON OF CoNsDEP-ATON.
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a
legal relation, or
(d) a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
(2) Consideration may be given to the promisor or to
some other person. It may be given 'by the promisee or by
some other person.
Comment.
a. The law generally imposes no duty on one who makes an in-
formal promise unless the promise is supported by sufficient
consideration (see Section 19)
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
Indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
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b. This Restatement distinguishes the two questions whether
there is consideration for a promise, and whether that considera-
tion is sufficient. This Section defines consideration in effect as
the price bargained for and paid for a promise, and in connection
with Section 19 states the principle that, subject to certain excep-
tions, an informal promise is not binding unless an agreed price
has been paid for it. Consideration must actually be bargained
for as the exchange for the promise. A statement that a consid-
eration has been bargained for does not conclusively prove the
fact. Recital of a payment not in fact made, but stated to have
been made as consideration, the statement being inserted merely
to make a transaction look like a bargain when in fact it was
not a bargain, does not suffice. The existence or non-existence
of a bargain where something has been parted with by the promisee
or received by the promisor depends upon the manifested inten-
tion of the parties.
c. Furthermore, although a price has been agreed upon and paid
for a promise, the promise is not binding unless the law deems the
price sufficient. The following Sections state when an agreed
price or consideration for a promise is sufficient to make the
promise binding and when such a price or consideration is in-
sufficient. The fact that the promisee relies on the promise to his
injury, or the promisor gains some advantage therefrom, does not
establish consideration without the element of bargain or agreed
exchange, but some informal promises are enforceable without the
element of bargain. These fall and are placed in the category
of contracts which are binding without assent or consideration
(see Topic D, Sections 85-94)
d. In unilateral contracts the consideration is something other
than a promise. It may be a specified act or forbearance, or any
one of several specified acts or forbearances of which the offeree
is given the choice, or such conduct as will produce a specified re-
sult. The offeror may also offer or request as consideration the
creation, modification or destruction of a purely intangible legal
relation. Not infrequently the consideration bargained for im
an act with the added requirement that a certain legal result shall
be produced. In bilateral contracts the consideration is a return
promise. What amounts to a promise is defined in Section 2.
Consideration may consist partly of promises and partly of other
acts or forbearances. Though a promise is itself an act, it is in
this connection distinguished from all other acts.
e. It matters not from whom the consideration moves or to whom
it goes. If it is bargained for as the exchange for the promise,
the promise is not gratuitous.
ANNOTATION
Washington decisions are in accord with this Section.
Subsection (1), (a) Attendance as a student at Stanford University
for four years is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay him $360
per year for so attending, Hoshor v. Kautz, 19 Wash. 258, 53 P 51 (1898)
making repairs by one who has permission, but is not under obliga-
tion to make them, Burke & Farrar v. Campbell, 128 Wash. 646, 224 P 9
(1924) caring for a person during his life is sufficient consideration
for a promise to devise land, Davies v. Cheadle, 31 Wash. 168, 71 P 728
(1903) completion of a public improvement on which work had been
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suspended because the assessment under which it was being made had
been declared invalid is sufficient consideration for the agreement of
property owners to pay for the improvement, Gerard v. Seattle, 73 Wash.
519, 132 P. 227 (1913) continuance in the service of an employer for
a fixed period by one employed for an indefinite term and who could
have quit at any time is sufficient consideration for the promise of the
employer to give a bonus therefor, Scott v. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470,
216 P. 853 (1923).
Subsection (1), (b). Forbearance of a threatened suit to enjoin the
erection of a bridge is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay all
damages resulting from its erection, where the right to have the work
enjoined was disputed and doubtful, even though the promisor may not
have been originally liable for resulting damages, Snohomzsh River Boom
Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 57 Wash. 693, 107 P 848 (1910) for-
bearance to press suit to foreclose a claimed lien on logs is sufficient
consideration for the promise of the purchaser of the logs to pay the
logger's claims, even though the lien should, in fact, be unenforceable,
Dybdahl v. Continental Lumber Co., 133 Wash. 81, 233 P. 10 (1925)
refraining from filing a mechanic's lien against property is sufficient
consideration to support the promise of the owner of the property to
pay for the work, even though the lien, if filed, could have been success-
fully contested for non-compliance with statutory requirements as to
filing duplicate statements of materials furnished, Wells & Morris 'v.
BrownL, 67 Wash. 351, 121 P 828 (1912) forbearance of collection of
an account and extension of further credit is sufficient consideration for
the guaranty of the account by a third party, Schoenzng v. Maple Valley
L. Co., 61 Wash. 332, 112 P. 381 (1910) waaver of a right of appeal
is consideration for the acceptance of less than the full amount of a
judgment in satisfaction, Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24, 67 P. 393
(1901).
Subsection (1), (c). Surrender by an administrator of a deceased
preemptor's right of possession is sufficient consideration for a promise,
Burch v. McDanzel, 2 W T. 58, 3 P. 586 (1881) permission by the
vendor of machinery to the vendee to take away the machinery without
payment in full of the purchase price is consideration for the guaranty
of payment thereof by a third party Washington Iron Co. v. McNaught,
35 Wash. 10, 76 P. 301 (1904) surrender by a contractor of the right
to extra compensation for work done in excess of the requirements of
his contract and his agreement to do certain work at less than contract
price is sufficient consideration for a promise by the employer to pay
more than contract price for work required by the contract, Wright v.
Tacoma, 87 Wash. 334, 151 P. 837 (1915) surrender by a receiver of
partnership property in his possession to one of the partners is sufficient
consideration for a bond given by said partner, although the appointment
of the receiver was invalid, Larsen v. Winder 20 Wash. 419, 55 P 563
(1898) surrender of possession by one who in good faith has entered
upon government land, is sufficient consideration, Waring v. Loomis, 35
Wash. 85, 76 P. 510 (1904) execution of a building contract by the
building owner is consideration for the promise of the contractor to
furnish a bond for the faithful performance of his contract, Sweeney v.
Aetna Indemnity Co., 34 Wash. 126, 74 P 1057 (1904) the purchase
of real estate is sufficient consideration for the promise of a real estate
agent making the sale to make a resale within nine months or refund
the purchase price, Herkenrath v. Ragley, 59 Wash. 52, 109 P 279 (1910)
giving an accepted order on a third person for the payment of a debt
not due is consideration for an agreement to forbear suit on a due note,
Stayer & Walker v. Misstmer 6 Wash. 173, 32 P 995 (1893) surrender
of possession by an agent in possession for heirs of a deceased preemptor,
though the entry of the deceased had expired by limitation but had not
been cancelled, and the agent's withdrawal of his own pending entry
constitute sufficient consideration for a promissory note, Harris v. John-
son, 75 Wash. 291, 134 P. 1048 (1913) the debt of a corporation and
an extension of time for its payment as sufficient consideration for the
personal note of the president of the corporation, Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash.
355, 108 P. 941 (1910) Shrive v. Crabtree, 149 Wash. 500, ibid., 271
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P 239 (1928), 274 P. 712 (1928) indorsemdnt of payment of overdue
interest on a note held by a bank is sufficient consideration for the note
of the officers of the bank for said interest, Skagit State Bank v. Moody,
86 Wash. 286, 150 P 425 (1915) taking by a plaintiff of an assignment
of a written contract to do hauling for a defendant is sufficient consid-
eration for defendant's promise to put a road in good condition, Beeson
Bros. v. Chambers, 155 Wash. 564, 285 P 443 (1930) an engineer who
had contracted to accept $300 in full for preparing plans and specifica-
tions for a proposed water system in case the improvement should be
financed and executed by others than his employers was not obliged
to surrender the plans on abandonment of the project by his employers
and, therefore, his surrender of the plans to a third party who financed
and executed the work constituted a good consideration for a modifica-
tion of his original contract to accept $300, Sharkey v. Cornell, 149 Wash.
102, 270 P 293 (1928) the acceptance by a bona fide purchaser of
illegally issued corporate stock of a promissory note of the corporation
for the amount paid for the stock, due in three months and indorsed by
an accommodation indorser is, in effect, a settlement of his cause of
action against the corporation and an extension of the time of payment
of his demand constituting a sufficient consideration for the accommoda-
tion indorsement, Hobson v. Marsh, 69 Wash. 326, 124 P 912 (1912)
the sale of a crop of wheat by a father to his son is supported by a suf-
ficient consideration where the son assumed the balance due on a land
contract and transferred his partnership interest in horses and tools,
Western Investment Co. v. Payne, 146 Wash. 361, 263 P 188 (1928)
extension of further credit to a debtor is sufficient consideration for
the promise of a guarantor to pay the past indebtedness and any indebt-
edness incurred under the extension of credit, W T. Rawlezgh Co. v.
Langeland, 145 Wash. 525, 261 P 93 (1927) a quit claim deed from
vendees under a contract to purchase, who were in default and had
abandoned the land, is sufficient consideration for a release of their ob-
ligation to pay a note given by them in the deal, National Association of
Creditors v. Mentsh, 144 Wash. 150, 257 P. 241 (1927) Seward v.
Seward, 145 Wash. 61, ibid., 258 P 856 (1927) the withdrawal of its
application by one of two applicants for a license to operate a stage route
and its consent that a sole certificate might issue to the other applicant
is sufficient consideration for the promise of the latter to pay the former
certain sums of money, even though the license issued to the promisor
did not give it the exclusive right of operation on said route, Inter City
Auto Stage Co. v. Bothell Bus Co., 139 Wash. 674, 247 P 1040 (1926)
transfer of corporate stock to the president of the corporation is suffi-
cient consideration for his agreement to assume and pay all its debts,
Washington Perfection Co. v. Damn, 138 Wash. 427 244 P 697 (1926)
employment by a railroad company, though for no definite time, of
a person having a claim against it for personal injuries, is sufficient
consideration for the release by him of such claim, Tyndall v. Northern
Pacific By. Co., 58 Wash. 118, 107 P 1045 (1910) $150 paid in com-
promise of an unliquidated claim for damages is sufficient consider-
ation for release of the claim, Trovik v. Grant Smith & Co., 74 Wash. 272,
133 P 454 (1913) the purchase by one partner of his co-partner's
interest in a logging contract is sufficient consideration for a modifica-
tion of the contract, Skoug v. Latour Creek R. Co., 114 Wash. 516, 195 P
216 (1921)
Subsection (1), (d) An agreement by the holder of a note, at the
request of the maker thereof, to extend the time of payment for a definite
period, is supported by the implied promise of the maker to pay the rate
of interest provided for in the note during the period of extension, Nelson
v. Flagg, 18 Wash. 39, 50 P. 571 (1897) Stankey v. Godunn, 158 Wash.
494, ibid., 291 P. 725 (1930) where the law made it necessary to re-
duce the number of saloons in a city by three, the promise of three saloon
keepers not to apply for licenses is sufficient consideration for the prom-
ise of the remaining saloon keepers in the city to pay $500 to each of the
three retiring, Jones v. Maes, 76 Wash. 517, 136 P 680 (1913) a
promise by a mortgagor to convey property to a mortgagee is sufficient
consideration to support the promise of the mortgagee to cancel the
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mortgage and cancel and return the mortgage note and the contract is
specifically enforceable, Virtue v. Stanley, 87 Wash. 167, 151 P. 270 (1915)
a bilateral contract containing mutual promises for the exchange
of certain properties needs no independent or separate consideration and
is specifically enforceable, Chapman v. Milliken, 136 Wash. 74, 79, 239 P. 4
6 (1925) a writing by which a party agrees to pay the assignee of a
lease for the use of the leased premises a fixed sum monthly during the
term of the lease in addition to the rent reserved in the lease, which
writing is signed by both parties, is a mutual, enforceable contract,
American Savzngs Bank v. Mafridge, 60 Wash. 180, 110 P 1015 (1910)
the promise of trustees of creditors to the father of the debtor to
obtain assignments from the creditors to the father of claims against the
debtor, to dismiss proceedings in bankruptcy and to permit the debtor
to take possession of his property, is sufficient consideration for the
note of the father, Taylor v. Ewvng, 74 Wash. 214, 133 P. 1009 (1913)
the personal note of the president of a corporation given to a bank in
settlement of the debt of the corporation is supported by the agreement
of the bank to turn over to him the balance of the proceeds of sale of
securities of the corporation held by the bank, Moore v. Kildall, 111 Wash.
504, 191 P. 394 (1920) the promise of the vendor of a lumber mill
to the vendee to extend the time of payment of the purchase price two
years, or longer if necessary, and to accept payment out of the output
of the mill, is supported by the promise of the vendee to enlarge the
capacity of the mill and to grant the vendor the exclusive right to handle
all of the vendee's products and to receive one dollar per thousand
therefor, although the vendee did not promise to cut a certain amount
or to operate the mill at a certain rate, Dent Lumber & Shzngle Co. v.
Cedarhome Lumber Co., 141 Wash. 593, 252 P. 141 (1927) a contract
by which a manufacturer promised to furnish goods to a jobber on credit
in consideration of the jobber's promise to sell the manufacturer's goods
exclusively, is not lacking m mutuality although the jobber did not agree
to purchase any definite quantity, Federal Iron & Brass Bed Co. v. Hock,
42 Wash. 668, 85 P. 418 (1906) the promise of a fish company to
transact its business with a certain bank is sufficient consideration for
the promise of the bank to extend a credit of $25,000- to the company,
Merchants Bank of Canada v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106, 209 P. 1113 (1922).
CONSmERATION MUST BE BAPGZ D Fop
Where lands were conveyed to a corporation expressly as an endow-
ment for educational purposes and it was apparent from the whole tenor
of the deed that the land was intended as a gift and that no consideration
for the conveyance was requested or expected from the grantee, the as-
sumption by the grantee of an indebtedness upon the land and its
incurrence of additional indebtedness in conducting a school upon the
land would not constitute consideration to prevent the land from re-
verting to the grantor upon the abandonment by the grantee of the
trust to which the land was devoted, Jenkzns v. Jenkins University, 17
Wash. 160, 49 P. 247 (1897) a promise to devise land to the prom-
isor's sister, can not be enforced after the death of the promisor although
the sister, in reliance on the promise moved with her family from Massa-
chusetts upon the land in question jn Washington and kept house for the
promisor until his death, it not appering that any return for the
promise was requested or expected, Mitchell v. Pine, 38 Wash. 691, 80
P. 774 (1905).
Subsection (2).
CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN TO THE PROMISOR OR TO
SOME OTMM PERSON
The signing of a building contract by the building owner is sufficient
consideration to support the bond of a surety guaranteeing performance
of the contract of the building contractor, Sweeney v. Aetna Indemnity
Co., 34 Wash. 126, 74 P. 1057 (1904) a consideration that moves to
a principal is sufficient to sustain the promise of the surety, Pacific
National Bank v. Aetna Indemniity Co., 33 Wash. 428, 74 P. 590 (1903)
Farmers State Bank v. Gray, 94 Wash. 431, 162 P 531 (1917).
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CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN BY THE PROMISEE OR BY
SOME OTHER PERSON
Where a manufacturing company entered into a contract with the
patentee of a motor to manufacture and sell the motor to agents ap-
pointed by the patentee and the manufacturer authorized a copy of said
contract to be furnished to such agents, there was sufficient consideration
for the manufacturer's promise to sell to said agents, Lloyd v. Am.ertan
Can Co., 128 Wash. 298, 222 P. 876 (1926) consideration moving from
a building contractor to a guarantor of his building contract supports
the guarantor's contract with the building owner, Sweeney v. Aetna In-
demnity Co., 34 Wash. 126, 74 P 1057 (1904).
Section 76. WHAT ACTS OR FORBEARANCES ARE SUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION.
Any consideration that is not a promise is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Section 19 (c), except the follow-
ing •
(a) An act or forbearance required by a legal duty that
is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and
reasonable dispute if the duty is owed either to the
promisor or to the public, or, if imposed by the law
of torts or crimes, is owed to any person;
(b) The surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid
claim or defense by one who has not an honest and
reasonable belief in its possible validity;
(c) The transfer of money or fungible goods as consider-
ation for a promise to transfer at the same time and
place a large amount of money or goods of the same
kind and quality
Comment
a. Section 75 defines consideration. The present Section states
what consideration is legally sufficient to support a unilateral
contract. Legal sufficiency does not depend upon the comparative
economic value of the consideration and of what is promised in re-
turn (see Section 81)
b. The satisfaction of the requirement of the sufficiency of con-
sideration, which is stated in Section 19 (c) as a requisite for the
formation of an informal contract, is but one of the requisites
enumerated in that Section. It is, however, with that requisite
alone that the present topic (Sections 75-84) deals. The effect of
illegality of the consideration will be stated in a later portion of
the Restatement of this Subject.
c. The duty referred to in this Section is confined to a duty for
which any remedy ordinarily allowed by the law for that kind
of duty is still available. O'ne who may at will avoid a legal
relation or refrain from any performance without legal conse-
quences, or against whom all remedies appropriate to the enforce-
ment of his duty have become barred, is not under a duty within
the meaning of the Section.
ANNOTATION
The following cases are in accord with this Section.
Subsection (a). The surrender of a note by one under obligation to
do so is not sufficient consideration to support a promise, Taylor v. How-
ard, 70 Wash. 217, 126 P. 423 (1912) payment of part of a liquidated,
undisputed claim is not sufficient consideration for the release of the
whole claim, Sanford v. Royal Insurance Co., 11 Wash. 653, 40 P 609
(1895) an agreement to extend the time of payment of the amount
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due upon a bill of sale and to make a ten per cent reduction thereof in
case the same was made at such time is without consideration, Champagne
v. McDonald, 141 Wash. 617, 251 P. 874 (1927) a promise by an em-
ployer to an employee under employment for a fixed term and fixed com-
pensation that a higher wage would be paid if the services of the
employee merited the approbation of an officer in charge is without con-
sideration, Tolmie v. Dean, 1 W T. 47 (1858) assignment by a mort-
gagor of a policy of insurance to the mortgagee is not consideration to
support the promise of the mortgagee to pay the mortgagor one-half the
proceeds of the policy where the mortgagor was under a contractual duty
to make the assignment, Lewis v. MeReavy, 7 Wash. 294, 34 P. 882
(1893) payment of a liquidated sum due is not sufficient as con-
sideration, Seattle, Renton & S. Ry. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 63
Wash. 639, 116 P. 289 (1911).
An act of forbearance required by a legal duty which is doubtful or reason-
ably disputed may be sufficient consideration.
Where part of a building in course of construction fell and the con-
tractor abandoned the work and, while the question whether the owner
or the contractor was responsible for the fall was in dispute, a surety for
the contractor entered into a new contract with the owner for the com-
pletion of the building, the performance of the new contract is a defense
to an action for breach of the first contract, Brodek v. Farnum, 11 Wash.
565, 570, 40 P. 189, 193 (1895) cancellation of a disputed stock sub-
scription is sufficient consideration to support settlement of all matters
of difference between the parties, Clark v. Waneta Power Co., 133 Wash.
1, 233 P 21 (1925).
The Supreme Court of Washington, however, holds that when a party
to a contract refuses to perform it, a new promise by the other party
to the contract for its performance, or for a promise of such perform-
ance, effects a rescission of the contract, and the performance, or prom-
ise of performance of what had been a duty under the original contract
constitutes sufficient consideration for such new promise.
A subcontractor commenced performance of his contract to grade a
road bed but, finding the compensation agreed upon inadequate, aban-
doned the work. The principal contractor then promised to pay him
a reasonable wage for completing the work. It was held that the new
promise to pay a reasonable wage was not without consideration. "Where
a party has breached his contract and refused to perform it, it is optional
with the adverse party to sue him for damages, or waive the breach, treat
the contract as abrogated and enter into a new contract with the delin-
quent party. It would seem to be elementary that parties competent to con-
tract can abrogate or rescind the contract and enter into a new contract
touching the same subject matter to be performed in the same or a differ-
ent way, upon a different consideration." Evans v. Oregon & Washington
R. Co., 58 Wash. 429, 108 P. 1095 (1910) approved in Smith Sand
Gravel Co. v. Corbin, 102 Wash. 306, 310; 173 P. 16 (1918)
An agreement between a landlord and a tenant by which a lesser sum
than the rent reserved in a written lease was agreed to be paid and
accepted in full for rent is supported by a valid consideration where, if
the reduction in rent had not been made, the tenant would have been
obliged to give up occupancy of the premises. "When a tenant.refuses
for any cause to pay rentals according to the terms of the contract of
lease, the landlord has an option as to the course he will pursue. He
may stand on the contract and take the remedies the law applicable to
the contract affords him, or he may treat the contract as abrogated and
enter into a new contract with the tenant. If he does the latter, the
mutual promises made by the one to the other furnish the consideration
for the agreement," Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201
P. 26 (1921).
Subsection (b). Forbearance to sue upon a note given by the maker to
the payee without consideration is not sufficient consideration for a new
note, Nicholson v. Neary, 77 Wash. 294, 137 P. 492 (1914) a promis-
sory note given for the value of cattle left in the care of the maker and
which were stolen without any fault on his part is without consideration,
Cun nings v. Wilk, 150 Wash. 512, 273 P. 527 (1929).
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Section 77 A PROMISE Is GENERALLY SUFFICIENT CONSIDERA-
TION.
Except as qualified by Sections, 78, 79 and 80, any prom-
ise whether absolute or conditional is a sufficient consider-
ation.
a. This Section in connection with Section 78, 79 and
80 states what consideration is sufficient in a bilateral con-
tract.
b. Where promises are exchanged, one or both of them
may be conditional, and though the condition of a promise
may never happen, and in that event the promisor will not
violate his promise if he does nothing, this alone does not
prevent the promise from being sufficient consideration.
Such conditional promises as are insufficient consideration
are defined in Sections 78 and 79.
Within the definition of consideration in Section 75,
taken in connection with Section 77, a promise by A to B
is sufficient consideration for a promise by B to C (see
Illustration 8 under Section 75).
See Annotation to Section 75, (1), (d), supra.
Section 78. A PROMISE IS INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION IF ITS
PERFORMANCE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INSUFFICIENT.
A promise is insufficient consideration if the promisor
knows or has reason to know at the time of making the
promise that it can be performed by some act or forbear-
ance which would be insufficient consideration for a uni-
lateral contract.
Comment
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable, though but for
the return promise the promisor would not have done what he has
promised, or though for lack of money or for other reason he is
unable to do so.
ANNOTATION
Washington cases are in accord with the section.
A promise by an executrix to pay a legatee less than the amount of
income provided by the will, the estate being adequate, is not considera-
tion for the promise of the legatee to accept the amount so promised,
Stahl v. Schwartz, 67 Wash. 25, 120 P 856 (1912) the promise of a bank
to pay a depositor the amount of his deposit upon condition will not
support the promise of the depositor to forfeit the amount of his deposit
in case the condition does not occur, Allen v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 76 Wash. 51, 135 P 621 (1913) a promise to pay less than
the amount due on a promissory note is not sufficient consideration for
a promise to extend the time of payment, Prsce v. Mitchell, 23 Wash. 742,
63 P 514 (1901).
Section 79. A PROMISE IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS CONSIDERA-
TION.
A promise or apparent promise which reserves by its
terms to the promisor the privilege of alternative courses
of conduct is insufficient consideration if any of these
courses of conduct would be insufficient consideration if it
alone were bargained for.
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Comment
a. This section is applicable to two classes of promises. In one
class the promissor undertakes to give any one of several perform-
ances, each of which is in a greater or less degree an object of
desire to the promisee. In the other class of eases one perform-
ance only is an object of such desire, but another course of conduct
by the terms of the promise is pernssible to the promisor in
case he deems it for his advantage to adopt that course. In both
cases the promise is sufficient consideration if it cannot be kept
without some action or forbearance which would be sufficient
consideration if it alone were bargained for.
b. Under the defimtion of "promise" in Section 2, words that
state an undertaking to do something if the "promisor" so desires
are apparently a promise, but not a promise in fact.
ANNOTATION
A contract between a saw mill company and an electric company by
which the former agreed to supply all mill waste produced in the opera-
tion of its mill to the latter for fuel for its power plant in consideration
that the electric company would supply the saw mill with electric power
and light, is not void for lack of mutuality because the mill company is
privileged to shut down its mill at pleasure, where the contract also
provides that in case of the shut down of the mill the electric company
should have the use of the saw mill's saws and conveyors for the purpose
of supplying necessary fuel, Sunset Shmngle Co. v. Northwest E. & W
Works, 118 Wash. 416, 203 P. 978 (1922) a promise to sell and
convey land is supported by a promise to buy and pay for the land
although the purchaser may satisfy all obligations by forfeiting $100 paid
on account of the purchase price, Wmrght v. Suydanz, 72 Wash. 587, 131 P.
239 (1913).
Section 80. A PROMISE WHICH Is NOT BINDING IS GENERALLY
INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
Except as stated in Section 84 (e), a promise which is
neither binding nor capable of becoming binding by accept-
ance of its terms is insufficient consideration, unless its
invalidity is caused by illegality due solely to facts that
the promisor neither knows nor has reason to know
Comment
a. The ultimate basis of the legal requirement of sufficient
consideration for promises is the belief not only that something
should be given in exchange for a promise in order to make it
binding, but that what is given should have value, althouh the test
of value for determining the sufficiency of consideration does not
completely correspond with value in fact, either as measured by the
opinion of mankind or by the opinion of the parties to the trans-
action.
b. A promise which is neither binding nor, like the promise in
an offer, capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its terms,
is regarded by the law as of no value. Therefore, a promise in
a bilateral agreement which falls within this catagory is insuffi-
cient consideration for a return promise, and the whole agree-
ment is inoperative. One of the promises may have such a defect
and bring about this result
s. because of total incapacity to contract on the part of the
promisor, or
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ii. because of such illegality or prohibition of the law as makes
a promise entirely inoperative, or
iii. because the promise itself is not supported by sufficient
consideration.
ANNOTATION
1. Promtse voadf because illegal.
A promise on behalf of certain officers of a railroad company to
locate a line of railroad and a depot upon certain land will not support
or render specifically enforceable the promise of the owner of the land
made in consideration thereof to convey one-half thereof for the benefit
of said officers, Redd v. Johnson, 27 Wash. 42, 67 P 381 (1901) a
promise to marry by a woman seriously afflicted with pulmonary tuber-
culosis is inadequate as consideration for a promise to marry her, G-rover
v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489, 87 P 638 (1906).
2. Promise void for uncertainty.
An option for the purchase of land at the expiration of one year at
a fixed price, given in consideration that the grantees "will, through the
Tacoma Ledger, use their best endeavors to advance the value of said
lands" and other lands of the grantor in the vicinity thereof, is not
founded upon a consideration which can be specifically enforced, owing
to its indefiniteness, and, consequently, does not afford sufficient con-
sideration to support an action for specific performance on behalf of the
grantees, Barton v. Smnnmng, 8 Wash. 458, 36 P 439 (1894).
Section 81. ADEQUACY OF VALUE OF CONSIDERATION IS IMMA-
TERIAL.
Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 76, 78, 79 and
80, gain or advantage to the promisor or loss or disadvan-
tage to the promisee, or the relative values of a promise
and the consideration for it, do not affect the sufficiency
of consideration.
Comment
Although, as stated in the Comment to Section 80, some con-
ception of value forms the basis of the legal requirement of suffi-
cient consideration, it is a general rule, subject to the qualifications
referred to in this Section, that whatever consideration a promisor
assents to as the price of his promise, is legally sufficient consider-
ation. But the fact that the value of what is stated as consideration
is insignificant as compared with the value of what is promised m
exchange is evidence, and under some circumstances may amount
to convincing evidence, that the transaction is not a bargain but
rather a promise to make a gift, and that it is, therefore, not a
promise for sufficient consideration.
ANNOTATION
A sale for $200 of a $2,000 note secured by a mortgage on real property
can not be rescinded for inadequacy of consideration although the vendor
at the time of the sale did not have knowledge that a bank had purchased
the mortgaged property and assumed payment of the mortgage indebted-
ness, thereby making the note collectible in full, no deception or fraud
having been practiced on the vendor, Opie v. Pacific Investment Co., 26
Wash. 505, 67 P 231 (1901).
"Mere inadequacy of consideration is not enough to avoid a contract
entered into between parties of mature judgment, nor can one who claims
to have been overreached invit the review of a court of equity unless the
inadequacy of consideration is so great tha a presumption of fraud follows
the recital of the transaction." Tausck v. Taussck, 52 Wash. 301, 311,
100 P 757, 761 (1909). Agreement to devise to a son-in-law property
worth $12,000 in collsideration of the agreement of the son-in-law to
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support for life his father-in-law, who was 83 years of age and who re-
pudiated the contract after receiving only four days' support and died
within two years, is specifically enforceable, Alexander v. Lewes, 104
Wash. 32, 175 P 572 (1918) Howland v. Day, 125 Wash. 480, 216 P.
864 (1923) semble, a guaranty in consideration of further credit to a
debtor, to pay a past indebtedness of $1569.42 and any further indebted-
ness that might be incurred, renders the guarantor liable for the past
indebtedness although new credit was extended to the amount of $789.80,
only, which sum had been fully paid by the debtor, W 'T. Rawlezgh Co. v.
Langeland, 145 Wash. 525, 261 P. 93 (1927).
Section 82. A RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION Is NOT CONCLUSIVE
PROOF.
A recital in a written agreement that a stated consider-
ation other than a promise has been given as consideration
is not conclusive proof of the fact.
Comment
a. The parol evidence rule does not prevent denial of the truth
of statements of fact contained in a written agreement, except
statements that the promises contained in the agreement have been
made. The rule forbids (see Section 238) proof that a promise
stated in a written agreement was not made n those terms.
ANNOTATION
"When one consideration is expressed in a deed, any other consider-
ation consistent with it may be averred and proved." Where a bill of
sale recites a consideration of $4,000 in gold coin, proof that the real
consideration was two hundred acres of land, $500 in cash, $200 in county
warrants and a receipted bill for $100 will not invalidate the bill of sale,
Van Lehn v. Morse, 16 Wash. 219, 47 P. 435 (1897) though a written
contract to release a judgment in excess of $1,000 recites that it is made
in consideration of the payment of $100 by the judgment debtor, it may be
shown that there was additional consideration for the agreement in the
debtor's forbearance to appeal from the judgment, Williams v. Blumen-
thal, 27 Wash. 24, 67 P 393 (1901) where a written contract for
the sale of a quarter section of land acknowledged payment of $2,700 in
cash as part of the purchase price, parol evidence is admissible that the
true consideration for such past payment was ten acres retained by
the grantor and the discharge of certain liens received as in lieu of the
$2,700 and the contract is not thereby invalidated, Roberts v. Stiltner,
101 Wash. 397, 172 P. 738 (1918).
Where a bill of sale of logs recited $300 as the consideration, it may
be shown that a part of the consideration was the agreement of the vendee
to pay an indebtedness of the vendor to a third party, Don Yook v. Wash-
ington MUl Co., 16 Wash. 459, 47 P 964 (1897) where a guaranty of
advances by a bank to a fish company recites that it is in consideration
of the bank "dealing" with the fish company, it may be proved by oral
testimony, that the real consideration was the oral agreement of the bank
to extend credit to the amount of $25,000, without guaranty, in considera-
ion of the promise of the promoters of the company that the account of
the company should be carried with the bank and that its business would
be there conducted, which agreement the bank refused to perform until the
guaranty was given, Merchants Bank of Canada v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106,
116, 209 P. 1113 (1922) parol testimony is admissible to prove the
real consideration for a contract reciting that it is given for one dollar
and "other considerations" if such testimony is merely to explain how the
contract came to be made and the consideration for it and not to contradict
the written instrument or its operative effect, Wright 'v. Stewart, 19 Wash.
179, 52 P. 1020 (1898) parol evidence is admissible to show what
was the actual consideration for a deed which recites a consideration of
$100, Warwwik v. Hitchings, 50 Wash. 140, 96 P. 960 (1908).
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Section 83. ONE CONSIDERATION MAY SUPPORT A NUMBER OF
PROMISES.
Consideration is sufficient for as many promises as are
bargained for and given in exchange for it if it would be
sufficient.
(a) for each one of them if that alone were bargained
for, or
(b)for at least one of them, and its insufficiency as con-
sideration for any of the others is due solely to the
fact that it is itself a promise for which the return
promise would not be sufficient consideration.
ANNOTATION
The extension of further credit to a debtor will support the promise
of a guarantor to pay the debtor's past, as well as future indebtedness,
W T Rawleigh Co. v. Langeland, 145 Wash. 525, 261 P 93 (1927)
the purchase of a butcher business at a fair market price constitutes a
sufficient consideration for the conveyance of the business and for the
seller's agreement not to engage in such business in the neighborhood for
a certain time, Nelson v. Brassington, 64 Wash. 180, 116 P 629 (1911)
Johnson v. Schultz, 137 Wash. 584, 243 P 644 (1926) employ-
ment of a towing company to do towage supports the agreement of the
towing company to do the towage and also to give notice of the loading
the cargo to enable the owner to obtain insurance, Gary-Davis Towing
Co. v. Spradley, 115 Wash. 93, 196 P 655 (1921) *
*To be continued.
